

Algeria in the Thinking of American Decision-Makers (2015–2025): From Security Cooperation to Strategic Partnership.

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Abstract

This study examines the radical shift in U.S. strategy toward Algeria during the period (2022–2025), as decision-makers in Washington moved from an approach of “pure security cooperation” to the construction of a “comprehensive economic and energy partnership.”

The study reviews how the global energy crisis led to the rediscovery of Algeria as a strategic and reliable alternative gas supplier, as well as the growing role of major U.S. energy companies in deepening this relationship. It also highlights the expansion of this partnership to include non-traditional sectors such as mining, rare earth elements, and cyber security, as part of a broader struggle for international influence.

The study concludes that the “2025 Vision” for strategic dialogue aims to transform Algeria into an American economic and technological platform in North Africa, while also identifying bureaucratic and geopolitical challenges that may hinder this trajectory.

Keywords: global energy security; economic diplomacy; rare earth elements and technological sovereignty; geopolitical competition; strategic dialogue (2025 Vision); Sahel and North Africa region.

Introduction:

Algerian–American relations currently hold significant strategic importance in the international context, given the profound transformations that have affected the U.S. “doctrine of engagement” in North Africa and the Mediterranean basin. Washington’s decision-makers no longer view Algeria solely through the lens of limited “functional cooperation” associated with counterterrorism. Instead, a new American vision has begun to emerge, recognizing Algeria as a pivotal regional power and an indispensable geopolitical actor in the equations of energy security and continental stability. This radical shift, which has accelerated since 2022, has been driven by structural changes in the global energy system and the emergence of competing international actors, thereby compelling the U.S. administration to redefine its priorities toward Algeria and move from the framework of “security coordination” to that of a “comprehensive economic partnership.”

The importance of this study stems from the need to understand the mechanisms of this new American positioning toward the horizon of 2025, where interests are no longer confined to the military dimension but have expanded to include major technological, mining, and investment stakes aimed at integrating Algeria into Western global supply chains. Accordingly, the central problem of the study is framed around the question of the extent to which American decision-

makers are capable of transforming Algeria into an “emerging strategic partner” that goes beyond traditional roles, and how such a partnership can balance American economic ambitions with Algerian sovereign constants amid intense international polarization.

To address this issue, the study will analyze two complementary dimensions. The first focuses on the geopolitical and security dimension and the diplomatic role played by Algeria as an architect of regional and international consensus (Axis One), while the second examines the economic and energy dimension by analyzing the strategies of major American energy companies in Algeria and exploring prospects for cooperation in rare earth minerals and digital technologies, as well as the bureaucratic and geopolitical challenges that may hinder this shared ambition within the framework of the “2025 Vision” (Axis Two).

Axis One: The Geopolitical and Security Dimension (Algeria as a Regional Safety Valve)

In the perception of American decision-makers whether in the White House, the Pentagon, or intelligence agencies Algeria represents a critical variable in the regional security equation that cannot be bypassed or replaced. Over the decade spanning 2015 to 2025, Washington has not regarded Algeria as a traditional ally (such as NATO allies), but rather as an “independent strategic partner” holding the keys to stability in some of the world’s most complex regions: the Sahel and the Mediterranean basin.

The American vision toward Algeria in its security dimension has been based on the philosophy of “political realism,” whereby Washington recognizes that Algeria possesses the longest land borders in the region, the strongest military institution in North Africa, and a stable political doctrine founded on “non-interference” and the “peaceful resolution of conflicts.” These factors have led American decision-makers to view Algeria as a “safety valve” protecting international interests from the expansion of extremist groups and the chaos of failed states, while also respecting the Algerian sovereign preference that rejects foreign military bases. This has generated a form of “mutual respect” grounded in shared security interests.

Based on these elements, the evolution of American security thinking toward Algeria can be traced through three key phases: (first) the consolidation of the doctrine of the “non-aligned ally” between 2015 and 2019; (second) the management of major political transitions and the preservation of institutional legitimacy between 2019 and 2021; and (third) positioning within the context of international polarization (2022–2025).

First: The Doctrine of the “Non-Aligned Ally” (2015–2019)

The American decision-maker’s approach toward Algeria during this period was grounded in the idea of “geopolitical exceptionalism,” where Algeria was seen as a partner that could not be placed within traditional frameworks of political or military dependency. Successive U.S. administrations recognized that Algeria’s effectiveness in its regional environment stemmed primarily from its adherence to a “non-alignment doctrine,” which granted it exceptional credibility in managing regional crises.

Rather than pressuring Algeria to alter this doctrine, strategic thinking in Washington moved toward leveraging it as a “balancing tool” in the Sahel and the Maghreb region, with a focus on two fundamental pillars that would constitute the core of this cooperation: Algeria as a regional force deterring terrorist groups in the Sahel (1), and Washington’s appreciation of the Algerian principle of non-intervention in exchange for professionalism in border security (2).

1. Algeria as a Regional Force Deterring Terrorist Groups in the Sahel

Amid the accelerating security transformations that have affected the Sahel region of Africa, a vision has emerged within American decision-making circles that places Algeria at the status of a “cornerstone” in any strategy aimed at curbing transnational armed organizations. Washington has recognized that Algeria’s deterrent power is not based solely on its quantitative military superiority, but rather on a unique “accumulated field and knowledge-based experience” in managing unconventional warfare.

Accordingly, the American strategic assessment has focused on two main dimensions of this deterrent capacity: informational and field leadership (a), and the disruption of terrorist supply chains (b).

a. Informational and Field Leadership (Operational Professionalism)

The American decision-maker’s assessment of Algerian field professionalism is grounded in the belief that “environmental knowledge” constitutes the most powerful weapon in asymmetric warfare. While Washington relies on advanced technology, the Pentagon views Algerian experience as a strategic complement that cannot be replaced by satellites. Algeria is classified in U.S. security reports as a “field school” capable of decoding patterns of terrorist movement in open desert environments.

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Based on this, American attention to this leadership is concentrated in the following key points:

- **Combat experience reservoir:** The American decision-maker considers the Algerian army the only force in the region that has fought a full-scale war against terrorism (during the 1990s) and emerged victorious using its own mechanisms. This “institutional memory” makes Algeria, in Washington’s view, a “consultative partner” rather than merely an operational security actor, as lessons are drawn from the Algerian experience in isolating armed groups from their social support base.

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- **Human intelligence versus technology:** U.S. intelligence agencies (CIA) recognize that Algeria maintains a complex human intelligence network in the Sahel region that exceeds electronic surveillance capabilities. The American decision-maker values this leadership because it provides “early warning” regarding the movements of Al-Qaeda and ISIS leaders, which Washington considers a safeguard for protecting its embassies and interests on the continent.³
- **Superiority in desert guerrilla warfare:** AFRICOM reports show admiration for the ability of Algerian special units to conduct surgical operations in harsh terrain and extreme climatic conditions. This form of “field professionalism” has led American decision-makers to prefer “technical coordination” (through the provision of night-vision equipment and advanced radar systems) rather than direct military presence, in confidence in the competence of the Algerian soldier.⁴

b. Disrupting Terrorist Supply Chains (Isolation of Conflict Hotspots)

The strategic decision-maker in Washington views Algerian geography not as a security burden but as a “circuit breaker” that prevents the formation of a continuous terrorist arc extending from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea. In American security doctrine, Algeria is considered

the only geopolitically and militarily capable force of imposing “spatial isolation” between the branches of jihadist organizations in the Sahel and their rear base in Libya. This has led Washington to rely on the Algerian role in thwarting the project of a “grand terrorist merger” that threatened continental security during the period (2015–2019)⁵. This vision is reflected in the following points:

- **Dismantling the “strategic depth” of organizations:** The Pentagon understands that the strength of armed groups in the Sahel depends on freedom of movement and cross-border logistics. The American decision-maker values Algeria’s ability to turn its borders into “impenetrable barriers,” forcing terrorist groups into isolated geographic pockets and depriving them of the “expansion and diffusion” advantage that characterized their activity in neighboring countries.⁶
- **Drying up financial and logistical sources:** Reports from the U.S. Department of the Treasury and the State Department emphasize Algeria’s role in monitoring smuggling routes, which constitute the financial lifeline of terrorism. In Washington’s perspective, Algeria has succeeded in tightening the noose around war economies (kidnapping, arms trafficking), which has directly contributed to weakening the operational capacity of “Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb” and remnants of ISIS⁷
- **Undermining terrorist “command unity”:** Analysts at the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) argue that strict surveillance imposed by Algeria on its southern and eastern borders has prevented terrorist leaders from holding major coordination meetings or unifying under a single central command. This geographical fragmentation imposed by Algeria has enabled Washington and its allies to target terrorist leaderships individually and weaken their organizational structure.⁸

2. Washington’s Appreciation of the Algerian Principle of Military “Non-Intervention” in Exchange for Professional Border Security

The principle of “non-intervention” in Algerian military doctrine has not been merely a diplomatic choice from the perspective of American decision-makers; rather, it has become the subject of deep strategic analysis within U.S. foreign policy circles. While some regional powers engaged in cross-border military adventures, Washington viewed Algerian discipline as a “model of sovereign stability” that serves long-term international interests.

The American strategic thought has recognized that Algeria’s capacity to secure its vast borders with high professionalism, without sliding into the quagmire of direct intervention, has created a “necessary balance” that has prevented the disintegration of the nation-state in North Africa.⁹ Accordingly, the American assessment of this orientation revolves around two complementary dimensions: ensuring institutional non-collapse (a), and professionalism in “border interface security” (b).

a. Ensuring Institutional Non-Collapse (Stability versus Intervention)

The American decision-maker, particularly within the National Security Council and the Department of State, reached a strategic conviction that the strength and cohesion of the Algerian state and its institutions constitute a vital interest for the United States that outweighs the value of involving the Algerian army in exhausting regional conflicts.

From the American perspective, the Algerian army represents the “backbone” of state stability, and any uncontrolled external military adventure could lead to the erosion of this stability a scenario that Washington fears due to its potentially catastrophic repercussions on the security of the Mediterranean basin¹⁰. The dimensions of this assessment are reflected in the following points:

- **Avoiding the geopolitical “quagmire of attrition”:** Analysts in Washington consider Algeria’s adherence to the principle of “non-intervention” as the factor that has protected it from being drawn into the crises in Libya and Mali. The American decision-maker values this Algerian awareness, which has refused to be drawn into the “militarization” of political crises, thereby preserving the readiness of the Algerian military institution to protect the domestic front and prevent the expansion of chaos into the African hinterland.¹¹
- **Preserving the nation-state as a reliable partner:** In the context of the collapse of political regimes and security institutions in neighboring countries, Algeria has emerged in Washington’s perception as a model of a resilient state. This institutional stability has led American decision-makers to prefer “a strong and internally stable Algeria” over “a militarily interventionist but internally weakened Algeria,” since the collapse of the Algerian state would mean the loss of one of Washington’s most important security pillars in the region.¹²
- **Convergence of views on political solutions:** The U.S. Department of State recognizes that Algeria’s doctrine of non-intervention is not passive, but rather oriented toward “sustainable sovereign solutions.” Washington has relied on this doctrine to justify its support for political mediation efforts, considering the Algerian approach rejecting foreign military intervention as the most effective guarantee to prevent the region from turning into a theater of proxy international conflicts.¹³

b. Border Protection as an International Security Service

The American decision-maker within the Pentagon and AFRICOM views the Algerian army’s exceptional capacity to secure an extensive and volatile land border stretching over 6,000 kilometers as a “logistical miracle” that directly serves U.S. national security. While neighboring states suffer from porous borders that allow the flow of weapons and fighters, Algeria has emerged as a solid “geopolitical barrier.” Washington does not view this professionalism merely as a national duty, but as an international strategic service that has prevented the Sahel and the Maghreb from becoming an open space for transcontinental terrorism¹⁴. This perspective is reflected in the following points:

- **Surveillance and control technology:** Algeria’s success in deploying advanced electronic surveillance systems and ground radar networks along its southern and eastern borders has attracted the admiration of U.S. military experts. Washington decision-makers see this Algerian “sovereign investment” as an effective alternative to foreign military intervention, with Algeria’s borders becoming fortified lines of contact preventing jihadist infiltration toward Western interests in the region.¹⁵
- **Reducing the “economies of chaos”:** U.S. intelligence agencies recognize that the professionalism of Algerian border guards in disrupting arms and human trafficking

operations has directly contributed to drying up funding sources for terrorist groups in Mali and Libya. For Washington, every intercepted weapons shipment by Algeria represents a “prevented terrorist operation” before it occurs, thereby reducing the global cost of the war on terror.¹⁶

- **International recognition of the “guardian” role:** International and U.S. reports indicate that Algeria plays the role of a “geopolitical guardian” of the Mediterranean region. The professionalism of border security has prevented Algerian coastal areas from becoming platforms for irregular migration or terrorist infiltration toward Europe, which has led American decision-makers to classify Algeria among the “pivotal powers” without which regional stability cannot be achieved.¹⁷

Second: Managing the Transition Phase and Ensuring Institutional Continuity (2019–2021)

The popular movement of February 2019 represented a real test of the flexibility of American strategic thinking toward Algeria. At a time when the region was still experiencing the devastating consequences of the “Arab Spring,” Washington’s decision-makers observed the Algerian political transformation with caution and anticipation.

The American vision during this phase was not focused on supporting one side against another, but rather on the “stability equation” namely, how to preserve Algeria’s regional role amid major internal transformations. Washington understood that the key to stability during this period lay in a “constitutional institutional transition” that would ensure the Algerian state remained an active partner in counterterrorism and regional security¹⁸. Accordingly, the American perspective was divided into two pillars: reliance on a “constitutional solution” and institutional legitimacy (1), and continuity of the security partnership (cooperation on Libya and the Sahel as a top priority) (2).

1. The American Bet on the “Constitutional Solution” and Institutional Legitimacy

The U.S. position toward the popular movement and political transition in Algeria was characterized by “cautious pragmatism.” The White House and the State Department avoided escalatory or interventionist rhetoric that had characterized their positions in other countries. This stance was based on a strategic conviction aimed at avoiding any “power vacuum” that could be exploited by extremist organizations, which led Washington to rely on the constitutional and institutional process led by the military as the only guarantee to prevent state collapse.

Accordingly, the American assessment of this phase focused on two key dimensions of legitimacy and stability¹⁹: supporting the electoral process as an alternative to chaos (State Department perspective) (a), and relying on the military institution as a guarantor of national unity (Pentagon perspective) (b).

a. Supporting the Electoral Process as an Alternative to Chaos (State Department Perspective)

The U.S. State Department’s approach to the 2019 political crisis in Algeria was shaped by the principle of “stability through the ballot box.” The diplomatic decision-maker in Washington favored an electoral process leading to the formation of an elected civilian authority with legal legitimacy to engage with the international community. Despite media and human rights

pressures, the State Department considered the presidential election held in December 2019 as the only viable solution to avoid a “constitutional vacuum” that could open the door to uncontrollable security²⁰ instability or undesirable external interference.

This perspective is reflected in the following points:

- **Prioritizing political realism over democratic advocacy:** Unlike its positions during earlier Arab Spring experiences, Washington did not call for radical regime change but focused on “smooth transition.” The American decision-maker viewed the electoral process as providing a “legitimizing framework” ensuring the continuity of Algeria’s international commitments, particularly in counterterrorism and energy cooperation.²¹
- **Fear of the “Libyan scenario”:** Concerns over state collapse dominated U.S. State Department reports, with the belief that prolonging the transitional phase without an elected president could lead to institutional disintegration. Washington therefore considered the success of the presidential election a “victory for stability,” preventing Algeria from sliding into institutional chaos similar to that experienced by neighboring countries.²²
- **Establishing channels with the “new authority”:** The American decision-maker quickly recognized the results of the electoral process and welcomed the elected president, viewing this as a necessary step to reactivate strategic consultation mechanisms. Washington regarded the new president as a partner possessing the “constitutional mandate” required to deepen security and economic cooperation in the post-movement phase.²³

b. Reliance on the Military Institution as a Guarantor of National Unity (Pentagon Perspective)

While the State Department focused on the diplomatic track, the U.S. defense establishment (the Pentagon and AFRICOM) concentrated on the cohesion of the Algerian army as the institution guaranteeing state continuity. In American security doctrine, the Algerian military during the (2019–2021) period was seen as the only stability pillar that prevented the country from sliding into a “Syrian” or “Libyan” scenario. Washington recognized that maintaining communication channels with the Algerian military leadership was the most reliable guarantee for sustaining regional security coordination and protecting strategic interests in the Sahel.²⁴

This perspective is reflected in the following points:

- **The army as a sovereign safety valve:** Analysts at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy argue that U.S. military decision-makers highly valued the Algerian army’s professionalism in protecting protesters and preventing armed confrontation. This capacity to manage the internal crisis while maintaining border combat readiness reinforced Washington’s belief that the military institution was the only actor capable of navigating the transition without dismantling the state.²⁵
- **Continuity of the “border doctrine”:** Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) reports emphasized that political change did not affect the discipline of troops stationed at the borders. For Washington, the continued performance of the “strong army” during the peak of the popular movement served as reassurance that Algeria would not become a

failed state exporting terrorism, but would remain a solid partner in containing instability from Mali and Libya.²⁶

- **Avoiding fragmentation and division:** A report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) notes that Washington's greatest concern was the possibility of internal division within the Algerian military institution. The American decision-maker therefore supported military cohesion and considered it a "red line" that must not be compromised, as the unity of the Algerian army ensures the security of Europe's southern flank against any uncontrolled security explosion.²⁷

2. Continuity of the Security Partnership (Coordination on Libya and the Sahel as a Top Priority)

Despite Algeria's internal preoccupations between 2019 and 2021, the American decision-maker in the Pentagon and the National Security Council insisted on maintaining security coordination channels at the highest level. This approach stemmed from Washington's recognition that any Algerian "withdrawal" from regional files would inevitably lead to the collapse of the first line of defense against terrorism in the Sahel and Libya. For the United States, the partnership with Algeria was not tied to a temporary political circumstance but to a "strategic constant" that views Algeria as the only actor capable of playing the role of a security and field mediator in complex border crises.²⁸

Accordingly, the American assessment during this phase focused on two operational axes: intelligence and operational coordination in the Sahel (a), and the political-security approach in the Libyan file (b).

a. Intelligence and Operational Coordination in the Sahel (Preventing a Vacuum)

The U.S. military decision-maker in AFRICOM recognized that Algeria's transitional phase (2019–2021) coincided with increased activity by extremist groups in the border triangle (Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso). This made continued intelligence coordination with Algeria a top priority that could not be postponed. For Washington, Algerian field expertise in the Sahel is an indispensable reference. The U.S. strategy during this period focused on ensuring the flow of Algerian intelligence to prevent the formation of a "new caliphate" in the Sahara, benefiting from Algeria's ability to penetrate the informational networks of armed groups.²⁹

This coordination is reflected in the following points:

- **Exchange of intelligence on "High Value Targets" (HVT):** Communication channels between Algerian security services and the CIA continued to exchange precise data on the movements of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb leadership. The American decision-maker considers Algeria to possess the most accurate "target bank" in the region, which has helped neutralize numerous threats before reaching U.S. interests.³⁰
- **Bridging the information gap in "grey zones":** Experts at the RAND Corporation analyze Algeria's role as the "primary provider of situational awareness" in areas beyond the reach of U.S. technology. Washington relies on Algerian assessments to understand complex tribal alliances in the Sahel field knowledge considered by the Pentagon essential for designing any counterterrorism strategy.³¹
- **Coordination in monitoring infiltration routes:** Operational coordination during this phase focused on exchanging U.S. satellite imagery for Algerian field reports on arms

and fighter smuggling routes. This “technical-field integration” enabled the detection of terrorist infiltration attempts by elements returning from Middle Eastern conflict zones toward the Sahel via Libyan territory.³²

- **Preventing the “positioning of competing powers”:** The American decision-maker considers that continued security coordination with Algeria in the Sahel also serves a broader strategic objective, namely limiting the expansion of influence by other international powers (such as Russia through Wagner) in the region. Washington bets on the idea that Algeria’s “sovereign and independent” role is best suited to balancing powers and preventing the Sahel from turning into an open arena of international conflict.³³

b. The political-security approach in the Libyan file (the “no foreign intervention” perspective):

The Libyan file constituted a central axis in the strategic dialogue between Algeria and Washington during the (2019–2021) period. The American decision-maker found in the “Algerian approach” a realistic way out of the Libyan civil war impasse. While regional powers were pushing toward a “military resolution,” Washington gradually adopted the Algerian vision based on a “comprehensive political solution” and the rejection of foreign military intervention. The American decision-maker came to recognize that Algeria possesses the advantage of “positive neutrality” and equal distance from all Libyan parties, which made it an indispensable partner in designing stability along the eastern borders.³⁴

This vision is reflected in the following points:

- **Supporting “political legitimacy” versus “militia rule”:** The American decision-maker in the State Department aligned with the Algerian counterpart on the need to strengthen central institutions in Libya. Washington viewed Algerian warnings against the dangers of “militarizing the crisis” as accurate, considering that any military victory by one side over another would only prolong chaos an outcome that serves the agenda of terrorist organizations such as ISIS in Libya.³⁵
- **Algeria as a communication channel with the “Libyan interior”:** Experts at the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) analyze Algeria’s role as a “strategic facilitator” that enabled Washington to understand the map of tribal and political forces in western and southern Libya. The American decision-maker relied on Algerian mediation to open previously closed dialogue channels in order to reach a ceasefire agreement and establish a unified transitional authority.³⁶
- **Convergence of views on the expulsion of mercenaries and foreign forces:** Washington adopted the Algerian demand regarding the necessity of withdrawing all foreign forces and mercenaries from Libya. For the American decision-maker, the presence of “shadow armies” (such as Wagner) represents a direct threat to NATO interests, which made Algeria a natural ally in the effort to “nationalize the Libyan decision” and protect shared borders from arms flows.³⁷
- **Libyan stability as a guarantee of regional security:** AFRICOM decision-makers view Algeria’s professionalism in managing the “Libyan interface” as having prevented Libyan territory from becoming a launching point for destabilizing Tunisia or Algeria’s

own hinterland. This “protective” role played by Algeria has reduced security pressure on the United States in the Mediterranean basin and reinforced Algeria’s value as a regional “balancing power.”³⁸

Third: Positioning within International Polarization (2022–2025)

The war in Ukraine and the intensification of Sino-American competition have produced a new geopolitical reality that placed Algerian “decision-making autonomy” under close scrutiny by Washington. In this phase, the American vision no longer merely observed Algeria’s regional role but increasingly monitored how Algeria balanced its historical relations with Moscow against its clear desire to open up to American technology and investment.

The U.S. National Security Council views Algeria as having succeeded in formulating a “new pragmatism” that allows it to remain a reliable security partner for Washington without abandoning its traditional alliances. This was further reinforced by Algeria’s election as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council (2024–2025), where it has become, in Washington’s perception, a “pivotal actor” capable of shaping consensus in sensitive files³⁹.

Accordingly, this positioning is structured around two pillars: managing a “dual relationship” (balancing Russian legacy and American technological ambition) (1), and Algeria’s role in the Security Council: coordinating positions on key dossiers (Gaza, Libya, Sahel) (2).

1. Managing the “Dual Relationship”: Balancing Russian Legacy and American Technological Ambition

The Algerian “dual relationship” with major powers represents one of the most complex issues in the American decision-maker’s assessment framework. While Washington is aware of the depth of historical military ties between Algeria and Moscow, it has begun to view Algeria through the lens of “pragmatic independence.”

American strategic thinking has shifted from pressuring Algeria to sever its relations with Russia to attempting to “attract” it through technological channels, considering that providing American technological alternatives is the most effective means of competing with Russian influence.⁴⁰

This positioning is reflected in the following dimensions:

- **The logic of “multiple partners” in American thinking:** Analysts at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) argue that Washington has begun to accept that Algeria will not abandon its traditional alliances. Instead of confrontation, the United States has sought to position itself as a “modernization partner.” The American decision-maker is betting on Algeria’s need to develop key sectors (cybersecurity, artificial intelligence), viewing these areas as entry points to expand U.S. influence in contrast to Russian arms cooperation.⁴¹
- **b. Managing tensions around CAATSA:** U.S. handling of Algerian military purchases from Russia has been characterized by flexibility, with the American decision-maker favoring a “quiet diplomacy” approach. This reflects an understanding that Algeria is an “independent customer” rather than a “political proxy,” and that maintaining balance with Algeria is essential to prevent its full alignment with Russia.⁴²

2. Algeria’s Role in the UN Security Council (2024–2025) and Coordination on Key Dossiers

Algeria's election as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council represents a strategic opportunity for the American decision-maker to reassess the effectiveness of Algerian diplomacy. For Washington, Algeria is seen as the most stable "voice of Africa and the Arab world," capable of shaping difficult compromises, making it an indispensable partner in managing international peace and security.

This role is reflected in the following dimensions:

- **Coordination on the Palestinian issue (Gaza file):** The American decision-maker closely monitors Algeria's influential role in the Security Council. Despite differences in policy scope, Washington recognizes that Algerian diplomatic pressure contributes to creating a "balance" that encourages de-escalation pathways and the opening of humanitarian corridors viewed as tools to reduce regional tensions.⁴³
- **b. Strengthening a "stability diplomacy" in the Sahel and Libya:** Washington relies on Algeria's role in the Security Council to elevate international attention to African crises. In American strategic thinking, Algeria is considered the actor most capable of convincing Council members of the need to link "security and development," an approach that Washington also supports as a long-term strategy to address the root causes of extremism.⁴⁴

Axis Two: The Economic and Energy Dimension (Algeria as an Emerging Strategic Partner)

American strategic thinking toward Algeria has undergone a radical transformation in parallel with the structural crises that have struck the global energy system since 2022. Washington's decision-makers have moved from an approach of "pure security cooperation" to a framework of "comprehensive economic partnership." The U.S. administration now recognizes that sustaining political stability in North Africa and the Sahel cannot be achieved without a solid economic base. Accordingly, Algeria has emerged in the annual reports of the U.S. Departments of State and Commerce as a "promising market" and a "strategic alternative" in energy and rare earth resource equations.⁴⁵

American interest is no longer limited to hydrocarbon imports; it has expanded to include the Pentagon and the White House's desire to link Algerian infrastructure with American technology in order to ensure the security of global supply chains away from competing monopolies⁴⁶. Based on this shift, this axis is addressed through the following points: the energy rediscovery of Algeria (post-2022 crisis) (first), diversification of partnership (beyond oil and gas) (second), and the prospects of future "strategic dialogue" (2025 vision) (third).

First: The Energy Rediscovery of Algeria (Post-2022 Crisis)

The geopolitical crisis in Europe in 2022 produced a shock in U.S. national security calculations, as Algeria shifted in Washington's strategic thinking from the category of a "traditional supplier" to that of a "vital strategic alternative." Washington no longer views Algeria solely as a source of fossil fuels but as a partner in "global energy security" and in ensuring the sustainability of supplies to allies. This shift prompted the U.S. administration to open broad investment and technical channels.⁴⁷

Accordingly, this section is addressed through two main points: Algeria as a strategic variable in global energy security (post-Russian gas era) (1), and the investment and technological positioning of major U.S. companies (2024–2025) (2).

1. Algeria as a Strategic Variable in Global Energy Security

The American vision toward Algeria in this regard is based on “energy realism,” which sees Algerian geography as a safety valve for the stability of the international market. This analysis branches into two dimensions:

- **Algeria as a reliable alternative to Russian gas from the Washington perspective:**

The American decision-maker within the National Security Council believes that European independence from Russian pressure necessarily passes through strengthening partnership with Algeria. Washington values Algeria’s “historical reliability,” as it has not used energy as a tool of political blackmail, making it the most capable actor of filling the energy gap in the Mediterranean basin and securing the needs of NATO countries in Southern Europe.⁴⁸

- **b. Pipeline and flow security as a U.S. geopolitical priority:**

American interest is not limited to gas quantities but extends to ensuring the security of infrastructure (trans-Mediterranean pipelines). In the thinking of the Pentagon and AFRICOM, Algeria’s stability and the protection of its energy installations constitute a vital interest to prevent any disruption of global supply chains. This has led Washington to intensify technical consultations on the protection of strategic sites.⁴⁹

2. Investment and Technological Positioning of Major U.S. Companies (2024–2025)

This period witnessed a shift from “economic diplomacy” to “field engagement,” as the American desire to establish a presence within Algeria’s energy core was translated through two tracks:

- **a. Strong entry of major corporations into the hydrocarbons sector:**

The signing of major agreements in 2024 and 2025 with leading American companies represents a pivotal shift. The decision-maker within the U.S. Department of Commerce views this investment presence as aimed at raising Algeria’s production capacities to record levels, while ensuring that the Algerian energy sector remains tied to American operational and managerial standards, away from the influence of competing powers.⁵⁰

- **b. Transfer of technological sovereignty (deep-water and shale gas exploration):**

Washington recognizes that Algeria possesses vast reserves requiring “advanced technology” available only in American companies. The decision-maker in Washington bets on providing American expertise in horizontal drilling and advanced seismic surveying as a tool of soft power, making American technology the “main driver” of Algeria’s energy future.⁵¹

Second: Diversification of Partnership (Beyond Oil and Gas)

American decision-making has shifted in its economic vision of Algeria from “energy monoculture” to “strategic diversification,” driven by Washington’s desire to reduce the influence of competing international powers (especially China) in emerging strategic sectors. The U.S. administration recognizes that Algeria possesses raw and structural capabilities that go beyond hydrocarbons, which has led the latest “strategic dialogue” to focus on building partnerships in sectors that ensure shared national security and technological sovereignty.⁵²

Accordingly, this section is addressed through two main points: strategic cooperation in mining and rare earth elements (1), and investment in digital technologies and cyber security (2).

1. Strategic Cooperation in the Mining and Rare Earth Sector

The mining sector in Algeria represents the “new front” of international geopolitical competition, as Washington has re-evaluated Algeria’s underground resources from the perspective of “strategic national security” rather than mere commercial investment. The U.S. administration recognizes that controlling future resources is key to technological and military superiority in the coming decades, placing Algeria at the center of global “supply chain security” outside Eastern monopolies.

This cooperation branches into two dimensions:

a. Competition with Chinese influence in critical minerals:

Washington closely monitors Algeria’s reserves of rare earth elements, lithium, zinc, and large iron deposits (particularly the Gara Djebilet project). The decision-maker in the White House views Chinese dominance in Africa’s mining sector as a threat to U.S. advanced technology production chains. Accordingly, Washington seeks to offer an “alternative partnership model” based on transparent financing mechanisms and strict environmental, social, and governance (ESG) standards. These tools are intended to balance Chinese investments and convince the Algerian side that cooperation with the United States ensures added value while preserving national sovereignty over resources and preventing their transformation into a geopolitical leverage tool in the hands of competing powers.⁵³

b. Transferring American expertise in “smart mining” and sustainable extraction:

Washington relies on the superiority of its companies in advanced mining technologies, particularly “smart mines” that use artificial intelligence and remote sensing in geological exploration. In the thinking of the U.S. Department of Commerce, providing Algeria with 3D seismic survey equipment and environmentally friendly extraction solutions constitutes a strategic entry point to deepen Algeria’s technological dependence on American expertise rather than less advanced Russian or Chinese alternatives. The American objective goes beyond extraction itself, aiming to transform Algeria into a “regional mining hub” operating under American standards, ensuring a stable flow of raw materials essential for electric vehicle batteries and semiconductor industries, which directly serves Washington’s strategy of gradual “decoupling” from Asian-dominated supply chains.⁵⁴

2. Investment in Digital Technologies and Cyber security

The Algerian–American partnership has moved beyond traditional material dimensions into the “virtual domain,” as strategic reports issued by the U.S. National Security Council classify Algeria as an emerging digital hub and a regional cyber power in North Africa and the Sahel. Washington considers securing Algeria’s digital space and linking it to American technological systems as a strategic guarantee to prevent rival powers from penetrating this vital domain.⁵⁵

This track branches into two dimensions:

a. Supporting digital transformation, e-governance, and digital sovereignty:

The U.S. administration, through institutions such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and in cooperation with major technology companies (Microsoft, Oracle, Google), seeks to be the primary partner in the digitalization of Algerian sovereign

sectors. The decision-maker in Washington believes that building a National Cloud and e-governance systems using American expertise creates a business environment governed by Western standards. This approach aims to ensure “interoperability” between Algerian and American systems, facilitating future investment flows in e-commerce and digital innovation while reducing opportunities for Chinese companies (such as Huawei) to dominate data infrastructure and sensitive information systems in Algeria.⁵⁶

b. Cyber security cooperation and protection of critical infrastructure:

Amid rising hybrid threats, Washington views Algeria’s “cyber resilience” as part of collective security. Algerian gas facilities and pipelines have become potential targets for cyber attacks that could destabilize international markets. The decision-makers in the Pentagon and the Cyber security and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) are working to transfer advanced technologies related to early threat detection and the protection of military and civilian communication networks. The American objective is to build a “digital shield” for Algeria based on American codes and software, giving Washington a central role in protecting the region’s digital depth and preventing Algerian cyberspace from being used as a launchpad for hostile cyberattacks against Western interests in the Mediterranean.⁵⁷

Third: Prospects of Future “Strategic Dialogue” (2025 Vision)

The “strategic dialogue” between Algeria and Washington is no longer merely periodic diplomatic meetings; in the American decision-making framework of 2025, it has become a “comprehensive umbrella” for managing complex interests in a volatile region. The U.S. administration believes that achieving a “qualitative partnership” with Algeria requires moving from coordination on urgent issues to building a sustainable vision covering the coming decade, under the pressure of intense global competition for influence in Africa.⁵⁸

Accordingly, this section is addressed through two main points: the shift toward the concept of a “comprehensive strategic partnership” (1), and the challenges and constraints of shared economic ambition (2).

1. The Shift toward a “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership”

The 2025 discourse of the U.S. State Department reflects a desire to move the relationship from “functional cooperation” (energy and security) to “strategic integration,” manifested in two tracks:

- **Institutionalizing high-level economic and technical dialogue:**

Washington seeks to institutionalize economic meetings by creating permanent technical committees overseeing technology transfer and facilitating capital flows. The American decision-maker believes that the stability of Algerian legislation (new investment law) provides an opportunity to present Algeria as a model of economic success in the region, thereby strengthening U.S. “attractiveness” vis-à-vis competing development models and making Algeria a key pillar in Washington’s strategy for shared prosperity in the Mediterranean basin.⁵⁹

- **b. Algeria as a platform for U.S. policy toward Africa:**

Washington views the “2025 Vision” from a regional perspective, where foreign policy planners in the White House see Algeria as the “safest gateway” to African markets (through the Trans-Saharan road project and free zones). The American objective is to use Algerian

economic power as a lever for U.S. interests in the African hinterland, balancing the economic penetration of Washington's competitors through a strong and independent local partner.

2. Challenges and Constraints of Shared Economic Ambition

Despite strategic optimism, the American decision-maker recognizes structural obstacles that require continuous management to prevent disruption of this emerging partnership:

a. Bureaucratic obstacles and business environment challenges:

U.S. Department of Commerce reports indicate that administrative bureaucracy and slow banking reforms in Algeria still pose challenges for small and medium-sized American enterprises (SMEs). Analysts in Washington argue that sustaining the partnership requires soft diplomatic pressure to accelerate financial digitalization and provide more flexible legal guarantees, which Washington considers a necessary condition for turning investment promises into tangible outcomes.⁶⁰

b. The cost of balancing great powers (the dilemma of polarization):

The greatest challenge lies in how Algeria balances its energy and technological commitments with Washington alongside its military and political ties with Moscow and Beijing. The American decision-maker fears that international pressures (such as sanctions or protectionist laws) may hinder some joint projects, making the "2025 Vision" a real test of both parties' ability to formulate a "strategic exception" that insulates economic interests from the volatility of global polarization.⁶¹

Conclusion

In conclusion, Algerian–American relations between (2022–2025) have moved beyond the logic of "cooperation by necessity" to reach a stage of "planned strategic interdependence." Algeria is no longer viewed in Washington merely as a technical partner in counterterrorism, but as a vital link in the architecture of the new U.S. national security system whether as an energy safety valve for Europe or as a diplomatic balancing power in Africa.

Through the analysis of cooperation trajectories and geopolitical positioning, the study reaches several key findings:

- Algeria has demonstrated a strong capacity to formulate a "new pragmatism" that has allowed it to preserve its sovereign decision-making between Russian and American poles, transforming its "dual relationship" from a diplomatic dilemma into a source of leverage enabling technological cooperation with the United States without sacrificing traditional alliances.
- The 2022 global energy crisis represented a genuine "moment of discovery" for Washington regarding Algeria's potential, leading major American companies to move from observation to heavy investment, reflecting a U.S. desire to integrate the Algerian economy into Western supply chains away from Eastern monopolies.
- Algeria's election to the UN Security Council (2024–2025) represents explicit American recognition of its role as an "architect of consensus," as coordination on the Sahel, Libya, and Gaza demonstrates Washington's reliance on the Algerian approach to ensure regional stability as an alternative to direct intervention policies.

Based on the findings up to 2025, relations are expected to move toward deeper institutionalization through a “comprehensive strategic dialogue.” Despite challenges related to administrative bureaucracy and the cost of balancing amid global polarization, there is a mutual political will to overcome these obstacles. Algeria, with its sovereign vision, and Washington, with its global interests, are moving toward shaping a “strategic contract” that positions Algeria not only as a gateway to Africa but as a fundamental pillar of stability and growth in the Mediterranean basin over the coming decade.

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