The Motion of Censure and the Vote of Confidence as Mechanisms of Parliamentary Oversight over the Executive Under the Algerian and Moroccan Constitutions

Abstract

The Algerian Constitution as amended in 2016 and the Moroccan Constitution of 2011 both embrace the principle of a flexible separation of powers, a principle reflected in numerous manifestations, among them legislative oversight of the executive power. Such oversight takes two forms: parliamentary oversight that does not engage the government’s political responsibility, and parliamentary oversight that does. Among the oversight mechanisms used by parliament to bring pressure to bear on the government, and potentially to drive it toward resignation, are the motion of censure and the vote of confidence. Owing to their gravity and to the serious legal consequences they entail, these two mechanisms have been made subject to a defined set of procedures. A comparison of the two constitutions’ oversight mechanisms reveals both similarities and differences; in both systems, however, these mechanisms prove to be instruments of limited rather than genuine effectiveness, owing to the executive’s dominance over every other branch of government.