The Role of the Executive Authority in the Organization and Functioning of the Constitutional Court

Abstract

This study examines how the executive authority shapes the organization and functioning of Algeria’s Constitutional Court in the aftermath of the 2020 constitutional amendment. While that reform underscored the Court’s independence, its mandate to safeguard the supremacy of the Constitution, and its contribution to consolidating the rule of law, the executive branch remains structurally present in key aspects of the Court’s institutional life. In particular, the analysis considers the influence of the President of the Republic and, depending on the institutional configuration, the Prime Minister or the Head of Government in the Court’s composition, the appointment of its members, and the determination of the conditions governing their election.

The study also addresses the executive authority’s role in triggering the Court’s competences through mandatory and discretionary referral mechanisms, which open the path to constitutional review of laws and regulatory instruments. It argues that this configuration raises persistent questions about the effective independence of constitutional adjudication. On that basis, the study concludes that constitutional governance requires a carefully maintained balance: review must remain operational and effective, yet the Court’s autonomy must be protected. Achieving this balance is essential for strengthening public confidence in the judiciary and for giving concrete expression to the principle of separation of powers.